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Remedies 
by Kenneth H. Y ork* 
This article will cover the remedial aspects of civil cases, 
and as such will mention several decisions which are reviewed 
elsewhere in this volume in a substantive law context. It 
will concentrate upon the California courts' application of 
various legal remedies (principally damages), equitable rem-
edies (including the existence of equitable jurisdiction), and 
restitutionary remedies (both legal and equitable) with some 
reference to the substantive elements needed for restitution. 
Choice of Tort, Contract or Restitution-Remedial Conse-
quences 
The remedial goals of compensatory damages for tortious 
wrongs differ from those of breach of contract-and both 
differ from the goal of restitution which may be alternatively 
sought. There are many instances of a plaintiff being allowed 
* A.B. 1937, LL.B. 1941, University 
of Colorado. Professor of Law, Uni-
versity of California at Los Angeles. 
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a choice of substantive theory for remedial advantage; exam-
ples include the routine waiver of the tort in favor of quasi-
contract to obtain the advantage of attachment, or the choice 
of damages or rescission in warranty and deceit cases. The 
joint venturer (in a land development arrangement), barred 
from a breach of contract action against his co-venturer short 
of an equitable accounting suit, may quite properly turn to 
a fraud count, as in Boyd v. Bevilacqua,! and recover damages 
for tort under the broad provisions of sections 3333 and 1709 
of the California Civil Code, rather than under the "out of 
pocket" limitations of section 3343 applicable to the vendor-
vendee relationship. To avoid this supposed "out of pocket" 
limitation on compensatory damages for deceit, the California 
Supreme Court, in Ward v. Taggert,2 allowed the plaintiff to 
choose between tort and restitution theories and thus pursue 
disparate remedial goals with concomitant advantages. With-
out quarreling with the propriety of permitting an aggrieved 
party to take his choice of substantive rights, it should be 
pointed out that while tort-con tract-restitution distinctions 
may be obscured, they cannot be remedially erased. Ward v. 
Taggert has spawned a line of decisions in which tort damages 
(properly or improperly) are disguised under a "constructive 
trust-unjust enrichment-quasi contract" rubric which applies 
to nothing of substance in the case.3 
Another remedial problem created by permissive tenden-
cies toward plaintiff's substantive law choices is the necessity 
of placing some fences around the playgrounds. In the famil-
iar situation where the plaintiff is permitted either to affirm 
a fraudulent contract and sue for damages for deceit or to 
disaffirm and take restitution, certain rules have been devel-
oped (albeit shaky ones) on forcing the inevitable election. 
Whenever the choice of substantive theory is extended into 
novel situations, similar guidelines should be laid down for 
the edification of the profession and the protection of defend-
ants from undue harassment. 
1. 247 Cal. App.2d 272, 55 Cal. 
Rptr. 610 (1966). 
2. 51 Cal.2d 736, 336 P.2d 534 
(1959). 
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Crisci v. Security Insurance Co.4 is a decision in point. 
The impact of this decision on the insurance industry is dis-
cussed elsewhere in this volume, and only the remedial impli-
cations are of concern here. The wrong committed was the 
refusal of a liability insurer to settle within the policy limits, 
where the ensuing trial resulted in a judgment against the 
insured in excess of those limits. Several years ago, in Comu-
nale v. Traders & General Insurance CO.,5 a claim based on 
the same wrong was allowed as a contractual one for purposes 
of assignability and the statute of limitations. Intervening 
cases6 assumed the claim to sound in contract, and the lower 
court in Crisci, acting on this assumption, ruled out a $25,000 
claim for mental distress. On appeal, the California Supreme 
Court made it clear that the plaintiff could elect a tort theory 
and reinstated the claim for mental anguish. This is all well 
and good, but the plaintiff cannot have it both ways at the 
same time, and an election must be compelled at some stage. 
Even an insurance company is entitled to know when. 
A similar problem may be developing with respect to cases 
on "wrongful life," as to remedial possibilities derived from 
a permitted choice of substantive theories. These cases in-
volve sterilization operations followed by unexpected preg-
nancies.7 
Restitution-General Application 
Restitution for unjust enrichment is a simple, but on occa-
sion a most puzzling and complicated, notion. It has emerged 
as a well-recognized branch of legal learning and its standard 
usages are sufficiently well defined to permit the treatment 
of restitutionary remedies within the topical organization of 
this article as it develops. As a very broadly based concept 
with a frank appeal to natural justice, restitution also lends 
itself very readily to application in unusual situations, and 
4. 66 Cal.2d 425, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 6. See, e.g., Critz v. Farmers Insur-
426 P.2d 173 (1967). For further dis- ance Group, 230 Cal. App.2d 788, 41 
cussion of this case, see Seligson, In- Cal. Rptr. 401, 12 ALR3d 1142 (1964). 
sura nee, in this volume. 7. See, e.g., Custodio v. Bauer, 251 
5. 50 Cal.2d 654, 328 P.2d 198, 68 Cal. App.2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 
ALR2d 883 (1958). (1967). 
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California courts have shown a commendable willingness to 
use this flexible device to come up with a remedy in litigation 
that lacks decisional precedent. 
Prof. John P. Dawson in his book, Unjust Enrichment,S 
mentions a case decided in France-"The great case of June 
15, 1892 [which] created a great sensation." A 
French farmer, a tenant of the defendant, had bought fertilizer 
from the plaintiff, who remained unpaid. After application 
of the fertilizer to the land, the lease was canceled because 
of the farmer's default and the defendant took possession. 
The farmer was insolvent, so the plaintiff sued the defendant 
directly for the benefit received from the application of the 
fertilizer to the land of the defendant. We quote from Prof. 
Dawson: 
So far it was not a great extension beyond [an] 1864 
case . . . of seed sold to a farmer, with other facts 
the same. There was one important difference, how-
ever; the Code gave a preferential claim on the proceeds 
of crops to suppliers of seeds, but not to suppliers of 
fertilizer. From seeds to fertilizer may be a 
short step across the barn, but it was a high dive for the 
Court of Cassation. For the Court, in refusing to reverse 
the lower court's judgment for the purchase price of the 
fertilizer, declared that the judgment did not falsely 
apply 'the principles of the actio de in rem verso.' By 
this simple phrase it elevated the principle of unjust en-
richment to a rank beside the Code. 9 
On September 22, 1967 the California Court of Appeal 
(Fifth District) decided a case, Kossian v. American National 
Insurance Co./o which is not going to cause a great sensation, 
but is nonetheless interesting by comparison. When the 
Bakersfield Inn burned down it left a pile of litigation as 
well as debris. The owner hired the plaintiff to clean up 
the debris for $18,900. The work was performed but the 
8. Dawson, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 10. 254 Cal. App.2d 694, 62 Cal. 
(1951). Rptr. 225 (1967). 
9. Dawson, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
p. 101 (1951). 
~8~ CAL LAW 1967 
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owner went bankrupt. The defendant was the beneficiary 
of a trust deed on the premises. The trustee in bankruptcy 
abandoned the premises to the defendant together with any 
interest of the bankrupt estate in the fire policies covering 
the respective interests of the owner and the lender under 
the deed of trust, and the defendant acquired the policies 
by assignment. All this may be regarded as the equivalent 
of a foreclosure of the trust deed. Thereafter defendant 
received insurance monies which included an undetermined 
sum for the clean-up. Plaintiff was now in the position of 
having no practically enforceable claim against the owner, 
and no lien against the premises. He therefore sued for unjust 
enrichment. The defendant correctly pointed out that there 
was a complete lack of privity between it and the plaintiff, 
and that there was no fraud or mistake involved. The court 
agreed that the plaintiff could not assert any claim of lien 
against the insurance funds similar to that allowed a material-
man who has relied upon a loan fund for reimbursement,l1 
but held, nevertheless, that plaintiff was entitled to reimburse-
ment from the defendant to the extent defendant received 
insurance monies in compensation for work already done by 
the plaintiff. The court said: 
We are cited no California cases that are close aboard, 
and independent research reveals none. Lack of prece-
dent applicable to the facts peculiar to this case is not 
surprising, however, as the authors of the Restatement 
recognize that the essential nature of equity cases con-
cerned with problems of restitution makes definitive 
precedent unlikely. We are guided by the "Underlying 
Principles" delineated in the Restatement.12 
Thus, as in the case involving the French farmer, the plaintiff, 
who had a valid though uncollectible contract claim against 
11. This rule has been more fully been induced to rely on the fund for 
stated in Doud Lumber Co. v. Guaranty payment. Unjust enrichment may exist 
Savings and Loan Ass'n., 254 Cal. App. even though construction is incomplete 
2d -, 60 Cal Rptr. 94 (1967). The at the time of foreclosure. 
materialman is given an equitable lien 12. 254 Cal. App.2d at 697-698, 62 
on proceeds of foreclosure of the secu- Cal. Rptr. at 227. 
rity for a construction loan when he has 
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one person, was given a restitutionary claim against a third 
person to whom a benefit of the contract could be traced on 
only the broadest of principles, which principles nonetheless 
appear to be multi-national in application. 
Certain unanswered questions are raised by the Kossian 
decision. Could the insurer have declined payment because 
the insured had sustained no loss? If the plaintiff held an 
unsatisfied judgment against the owner in a contract action, 
could he have sued the insurer directly for reimbursement 
under the coverage for the clean-up if settlement had not 
otherwise been made? The decision invites comparison with 
Allen v. Powell,13 in which a real estate broker, who had nego-
tiated a lease, was left with a claim for a commission of 
$60,000 against insolvent parties because of the alleged tor-
tious action of the defendant-lessee in conspiring with the 
lessor to interfere with the broker's contractual right to collect 
the listed commission. The defendant-lessee had made sepa-
rate arrangements to pay rent directly to creditors of the finan-
cially troubled lessors, and apparently obtained thereby some 
concessions against the rent to be paid. The complaint set 
forth a tort count, and a count for "unjust enrichment" in 
that defendant "by its said collusive action procured said land 
at a sum which was less than the fair market value thereof 
by the amount of the plaintiff's $60,000 commission."14 The 
court held that the second count stated neither a cause of 
action for a constructive trust (there being an adequate legal 
remedy for tort damages), nor for quasi-contract recovery 
based on a waiver of the tort. For the latter remedy, said 
the court: 
"[T]here must be something moving to the defendant to 
support the implied promise to pay therefor. . . . Plaintiffs 
must simply rely on the tort."15 Conceptually, the Allen 
decision seems rather more doctrinaire than Kossian. 
Although the California courts are willing to use restitution 
for unjust enrichment, they are not necessarily above misusing 
13. 248 Cal. App.2d 502, 56 Cal. 15. 248 Cal. App.2d at 510, 56 Cal. 
Rptr. 715 (1967). Rptr. at 721. 
14. 248 Cal. App.2d at 509, 56 Cal. 
Rptr. at 720. 
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it. In Palmer v. Gregg,16 an action in quantum meruit had 
been filed against the estate of the decedent, the plaintiff 
alleging the rendition of services to decedent before his death 
"with the expectation on the part of both . . . that plaintiff 
would be compensated therefor.»l7 On appeal the Supreme 
Court eliminated certain items on the basis that they were 
not of direct benefit to the decedent and could not be recov-
ered in quantum meruit. It is almost embarrassing to suggest 
that the Supreme Court has here confused contract and quasi-
contract, and that, as stated, the problem was whether the 
questioned services were included in the contract, and not 
whether there was benefit. 
Another seeming misapplication of restitutionary remedies 
appears in the case of Thompson v. Price.1s Defendant Price 
and his wife took half the shares in the J. A. C. Corporation 
and Thompson took the other half. After being entrusted 
with management, Price allegedly violated most of the fidu-
ciary duties listed in standard corporate texts, including diver-
sion of corporate opportunities and the withdrawal, in the 
form of improper salaries and fees, of more than he had in-
vested. On behalf of themselves and the corporation, the 
plaintiffs sought to have a constructive trust declared in Price's 
shares, which remedy the trial court denied. The appellate 
court reversed, holding that, by withdrawing more than he 
had put in, Price had put the total risk of the corporation on 
Thompson; therefore, the corporate investments thereafter 
made were really Thompson's investments and thus Price, in 
his position as shareholder, would be unjustly enriched. What-
ever the merits as between the parties, this equitable restitu-
tionary remedy of a constructive trust appears inappropriately 
applied, since the shares were not originally acquired in any 
improper fashion. The court is simply causing them to be 
forfeited because of personal and corporate claims. 
16. 65 Cal.2d 657, 56 Cal. Rptr. 97, 18. 251 Cal. App.2d 182, 59 Cal. 
422 P.2d 985 (1967). Rptr. 174 (1967). For further discus-
17. 65 Cal.2d at 660, 56 Cal. Rptr. sion, see Brandel, Business Associations, 
at 98, 422 P.2d at 986. in this volume. 
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Equitable Jurisdiction and Remedies in General-as Distin-
guished from Equitable Jurisdiction 
Erroneous exercise of equitable jurisdiction is usually tested 
by appeal, whereas void orders issued in the absence of pri-
mary jurisdiction or in obvious and gross excess of equitable 
jurisdiction are subject to immediate attack by extraordinary 
writ. An application of these principles appears in United 
Farm Workers Organizing Committee v. Superior Court/9 
wherein prohibition rather than appeal was held to be the 
proper recourse against a lower court injunction decree, al-
leged and found to be unconstitutional. 
Maintenance of Litigational Status-Preliminary In-
junctions 
A mandatory temporary injunction to pay over money 
would seem to be peculiarly vulnerable under routine equity 
principles, but such an order was sustained on appeal in Fretz 
v. Burke,20 in what was basically a partnership accounting 
suit. Upon service of summons and complaint, the defendant 
had begun placing the plaintiff's share of profits, $5,000 per 
month, in a "suspense account"; the account had reached the 
sum of $35,000. The defendant's explanation was that the 
sums might be needed to reimburse him for costs and expenses 
in conjunction with the current litigation, a wholly baseless 
excuse. The trial court issued a preliminary order to pay 
over the retained profits with $5,000 to be placed in trust, 
and to pay over future shares to which plaintiff might become 
entitled. This was affirmed on appeal. Defendant's main 
objections and the court's answers thereto may be summarized 
as follows: 
( 1) A temporary decree should not issue to correct past 
actions, but only future actions. The court pointed out that 
here there was a plain intent to continue. 
(2) This was a mandatory decree and improper at the 
interlocutory stage. While it is true such decrees are un-
common, the status quo here was in fact a state of action, 
monthly payments, which the defendant had interrupted. 
19. 254 Cal. App.2d 841, 62 Cal. 20. 247 Cal. App.2d 741, 55 Cal. 
Rptr. 567 (1967). Rptr. 879 (1967). 
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(3) The decree was for the payment of money, and there-
fore unenforceable by the usual civil contempt proceedings 
of equity. The court recognized that this case was an excep-
tion in that it was the payment of a fund held by a fiduciary, 
and not an indebtedness. 
(4) No irreparable injury was shown. The court said 
that, regardless, the defendant's action might be properly 
considered as "insufferable" and an overbearing assumption 
of superiority and domination over the rights of others. It 
must be admitted that the California courts' attitude as to 
this element of equitable jurisdiction adds a new dimension 
to the law. 
(5) A court may not enjoin a breach with respect to a 
contract that cannot be specifically enforced. [Apparently 
this contention had reference to the lack of equitable jurisdic-
tion to control a partnership by decree.] The court, however, 
noted that this was an accounting rather than a specific per-
formance suit. 
Overall the decision represents a proper discretionary appli-
cation of equitable doctrines in exceptional circumstances. 
It might be noted that no reference was made to the holdings 
in California that mandatory temporary orders are subject 
to stay on appeal.1 
Declaratory Judgments 
The declaratory judgment is an extension of the equitable 
bill quia timet and, although statutory, is subject to equitable 
principles. The widespread practice of using the declaratory 
judgment device to obtain calendar priority in inapposite sit-
uations received a setback in Travers v. Louden. 2 The com-
plaint merely sought a declaration as to whether defendant 
had broken a contract. No other remedy was sought. Sum-
mary judgment against the plaintiff was affirmed. The court 
observed that the rights of the parties "had crystallized into 
a cause of action for past wrongs.,,3 
1. See Paramount Pictures Corp. v. 
Davis, 228 Cal. App.2d 827, 39 Cal. 
Rptr. 791 (1964). 
2. 254 Cal. App.2d 1044, 62 Cal. 
Rptr. 654 (1967). 
3. 254 Cal. App.2d at 1047, 62 Cal. 
Rptr. at 656. 
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The declaratory judgment is becoming a routine remedy 
to test the constitutionality of penal ordinances, and its avail-
ability is normally not even seriously questioned.4 As an 
extension of the equitable remedy of injunction against op-
pressive government actions (with which it is frequently 
combined), the declaratory judgment is made subject to tradi-
tional criteria for equitable jurisdiction in this type of case, 
with the result that its exercise is erratic. Perhaps this reflects 
some reservations as to whether equitable jurisdiction should 
be confined to declaring a penal ordinance unconstitutional, 
as such, or should be expanded to determine whether a person 
is exposed to a possible unconstitutional application of a penal 
statute as to him. 
In one case in point, the California Water and Telephone 
Company challenged the constitutionality of a Los Angeles 
County ordinance related to procedures attendant upon the 
installation of a water supply system to subdivisions.5 The 
impact of the ordinance was quite remote, as there was no 
prosecution or threat of prosecution at the time. After con-
siderable discussion it was held that constitutional questions 
could be decided through a declaratory judgment, but that a 
concomitant injunction would be dissolved as being needless 
under the circumstances. Two prior cases (which technically 
antedate the temporal scope of this article) showed an 
ambivalence toward the remedy. In Manchel v. County of 
Los Angeles6 an injunction (in conjunction with a declaratory 
judgment suit) against the enforcement of an ordinance 
against playing the game of "pan" was struck down on appeal 
on the grounds that there was no issue of unconstitutionality 
of the ordinance, no deprivation of a property right leading 
to irreparable injury was shown, and injunctions against crim-
inal prosecutions will not ordinarily be issued in suits for 
declaratory relief. On the other hand, in Landau v. Fording7 
4. See, e.g., La Franchi v. City of 
Santa Rosa, 8 Ca1.2d 331, 65 P.2d 1301, 
110 ALR 639 (1937). 
5. Cal. Water & Telephone Co. v. 
County of Los Angeles, 253 Cal. App.2d 
11, 61 Cal. Rptr. 618 (1967). 
292 CAL LAW 1967 
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a declaratory judgment was issued that the film ("Un Chant 
d'Amour") was obscene. Plaintiff had been threatened with 
arrest by the Berkeley Police Department. Nothing was said 
about the propriety of the proceedings or as to exactly what 
effect the decree would have in the event a criminal action 
were to follow. 
Remedies for Injuries to Tangible Property Interests 
Trespass-Damages 
We are reminded, in Costerisan v. Tejon Ranch Company,S 
that "damage" is a substantive element of the tort of trespass, 
so a jury finding of a trespass without damage is a nUllity. 
Nominal damages, however, should have sufficed to validate 
the verdict. This seemingly trivial point acquires greater 
magnitude when its relevance to assessment for costs is con-
sidered. 
The measure of damages against innocent trespassers who 
remove a portion of the freehold is reviewed again in the 
third appeal in prolonged litigation-the case now has the 
title of Bates v. Smith.9 Defendants had in good faith mined 
4,663 tons of gypsite from the plaintiff's holdings and sold 
the mineral after some processing. There was no profit; 
indeed, a loss from the operation was indicated. On a pre-
vious appeal, the court had directed that the damages should 
be measured by the value of the mineral in situ by determining 
"reasonable market value" less the reasonable cost of transpor-
tation and cost of milling and mining. Thereupon the trial 
court determined the market value at $3.50 per ton and 
subtracted $1.10 per ton for delivery costs, which would give 
a value of $2.40 per ton at the mine head. This was raised 
to $2.50 on an allowance for upgrading the particular mineral 
because of its percentage rating of gypsite content. The trial 
a part of the offense proscribed by 
Penal Code § 311.2 was specifically 
overruled in People v. Noroff, 67 Cal.2d 
814, 63 Cal. Rptr, 575, 433 P.2d 479 
(1967) . For further discussion of this 
case see Leahy, Constitutional Law, in 
this volume. 
8. 255 Cal. App.2d 77, 62 Cal. Rptr. 
800 (1967). 
9. 246 Cal. App.2d 357, 54 Cal. Rptr. 
624 (1966). 
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court then determined the "reasonable" cost for milling and 
mining, partial screening, and for road-building expense at 
$1.22 per ton. Thus, $2.50 less $1.22 times 4,663 tons 
equals $5,968.64 damages. Defendants now urged that the 
actual costs of mining and milling should have been offset 
against the value at the pit head, pointing out that the word 
"reasonable" had not been used in the prior opinion relative 
to mining and milling costs. The appellate court rejected this 
contention, noting that holding otherwise would allow the 
unskillful or improvident innocent trespasser to escape all 
damage liability. Such a result would hardly be proper com-
pensation to an owner who has had 4,663 tons of gypsite 
stripped from his land. 
The rules as to measuring damages for trespass for removal 
of ore were also reviewed in Whittaker v. OttdO without refer-
ence to the Bates decision. In this case the court protected 
the purchaser of the ore on the theory that personal property 
produced from real property by the efforts of an innocent 
trespasser becomes marketable-an apparent extension of the 
property doctrine of "accession." 
Trespass-Injunction against Encroachments 
A private injunction against utility companies is difficult 
because of the probable intervention of a public use. In a 
quiet title-injunction suit, Slemons v. Southern California Edi-
son CO.,!l brought on by the installation of three power poles 
on plaintiff's land, a decree for the plaintiff was affirmed on 
the ground that the taking must be for a substantial public 
use. The availability of an alternate route is thus a factor 
in the landowner's favor. 
Personal Property-Negligent Injuries-Damages 
The owner of a damaged automobile is entitled to the cost 
of repairs plus loss-of-use value until repaired, or to the value 
of the automobile in the case of total destruction plus loss-of-
use value (under certain circumstances) until replaced. In 
10. 248 Cal. App.2d 666, 56 Ca1. 11. 252 Cal. App.2d 1088, 60 Cal. 
Rptr. 836 (1967). Rptr. 785 (1967). 
294 CAL LAW 1967 
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Owens v. Pyeatt/2 the insurer, Allstate, undertook repairs 
which were unsatisfactory to the owner, and the latter declined 
to sign a proffered release (which Allstate, by the terms of 
the policy, was not entitled to demand). Inasmuch as the 
repairs were not appropriate, plaintiff lost the use of the car 
for twenty-nine months, for which the trial court allowed 
$1,250 damages. The appellate court held that this award 
was too low where there had been a clear showing that the 
loss of use in terms of minimum rental for twenty-nine months 
exceeded $3,000, even with generous allowance for deprecia-
tion, etc. 
Remedies for Personal Injuries 
Wrongful Death Damages-Adequacy 
A new trial on the sole issue of damages was granted in 
Haskins v. Holmes. I3 Plaintiff had sustained a fractured 
cheek and jaw requiring surgery. In a nonjury trial, $1,000 
damages were awarded of which $911.37 were ascribed to 
special damages for medical and similar costs, leaving only 
$88.63 for general damages. This the appellate court re-
garded as obviously inadequate for the pain, suffering, and 
inconvenience manifestly incurred. Likewise a new trial 
limited to the damage issue was ordered in Doyle v. Hamren,t4 
a wrongful death case, where the decedent had a 44-year life 
expectancy and a wife and child, and had earned a substantial 
income while in school. The appellate court estimated that 
annual earnings of $5,000 for 40 years would have a present 
value of $98,965-a minimal estimation of damages and yet 
grossly in excess of the $50,000 verdict. By comparison, a 
mere $30,000 wrongful death award was affirmed in Syah 
v. Johnson/5 where the decedent had a wife and two minor 
daughters and a life expectancy of 30 years. The deceased 
in this instance was a penniless paroled convict and a com-
pulsive gambler who had abandoned his wife and taken their 
12. 248 Cal. App.2d 840, 57 Cal. 14. 246 Cal. App.2d 733, 55 Cal. 
Rptr. 100 (1967). Rptr. 84 (1966). 
13. 252 Cal. App.2d 580, 60 Cal. 15. 247 Cal. App.2d 534, 55 Cal. 
Rptr. 659 (1967). Rptr. 741 (1966). 
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small savings with him. However, the evidence indicated 
that between gambling episodes the deceased displayed 
some affection for his family and had earned up to $100 per 
week before being sent to the penitentiary. 
In two personal injury cases, Gallentine v. Richardson16 and 
Buniger v. Buniger/7 new trials on all issues were directed 
because the inadequacy of the verdicts indicated that the 
respective juries were divided as to liability. The decision 
in Jehl v. Southern Pacific Company,18 permitting additur in 
California, should affect the volume of appellate decisions 
involving retrials on the issue of damages. 
Damages-Punitive 
Products liability cases are usually directed at solvent cor-
porations, and in addition to sizeable personal injury awards, 
punitive damages of major proportions may be imposed. A 
concerted, but unsuccessful, attack upon the allowance of 
such recoveries was made in Toole v. Richardson-Merrel, 
Inc. /9 where a verdict of $175,000 general damages and 
$500,000 punitive damages was reduced to $250,000 and, 
thus reduced, affirmed. Specifically, the objections were 
directed to the propriety of punitive damages against corpo-
rations (which awards, as critics have emphasized, are borne 
by many shareholders who are in no position to control man-
agement); that the required "malice in fact" was not (and 
perhaps could not be) shown; and that punitive damages are in 
fact unconstitutional. 
Remedies for Deception 
As mentioned in the opening paragraphs of this article, 
deceptive practices in bargaining transactions are wrongs for 
which the offended party may be given substantive law choices 
16. 248 Cal. App.2d 152, 56 Cal. 
Rptr. 237 (1967). 
17. 249 Cal. App.2d 50, 57 Cal. Rptr. 
1 (1967). 
18. 66 Cal.2d 821, 59 Cal. Rptr. 276, 
427 P.2d 988 (1967). 
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between tort, contract, or restitution. Remedial possibilities 
may affect the election. 
Damages 
A promise made without intent to perform may, upon non-
performance, be treated as breach of contract, or as the com-
mission of common-law deceit. The latter remedy affords 
recovery of all damages proximately caused, whether or not 
within the contemplation of the parties, and also punitive 
damages. These remedial advantages probably influenced 
the plaintiff's choice in two recent cases. In Wilkenson v. 
Linnecke,20 the defendant promised (without intent to per-
form) to obtain security for a loan of $10,000 advanced by 
the plaintiff to a third party. The loan was uncollectible, and 
in a tort action, damages to the amount of the loan plus 
$1,000 punitive damages were awarded and affirmed on ap-
peal. The other case, Brockway v. Heilman/ involved the 
sale of a cafe, bar, and liquor license, with $22,000 of the 
price being allocated to the property and $20,000 to the 
liquor license. The plaintiff buyer, received only the prop-
erty, although he paid $7,358.88 in excess of $22,000. The 
"eller committed actionable fraud in that he had no intent 
at the time of making the contract to deliver the liquor license. 
A judgment in a tort action for $7,358.58 plus $5,000 punitive 
damages was affirmed on appeal, the court holding this to 
be a proper application of section 3343 of the Civil Code2 
(out-of-pocket rule), with dicta to the effect that section 3343 
is not the exclusive remedy. Under the circumstances, a 
question might be raised as to possible advantages in electing 
the alternative remedy for breach of contract. 
20. 251 Cal. App.2d 291, 59 Cal. 
Rptr. 290 (1967). 
1. 250 Cal. App.2d 807, 58 Cal. Rptr. 
772 (1967). 
2. Cal. Civ. Code § 3343. Damages 
for fraud in pnrchase, sale or exchange 
of property. 
One defrauded in the purchase, sale 
or exchange of property is entitled to 
recover the difference between the actual 
value of that with which the defrauded 
person parted and the actual value of 
that which he received, together with 
any additional damage arising from the 
particular transaction. 
Nothing herein contained shall be 
deemed to deny to any person having a 
cause of action for fraud or deceit any 
legal or equitable remedies to which 
such person may be entitled. 
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Damages-Collateral Source 
The Souza & McCue Construction Co. held a contract for 
the construction of a sewer line for the City of Salinas. Be-
cause of the latter's deceit (by active concealment) as to soil 
conditions which affected the bid, Souza secured a $124,100 
judgment for damages, calculated as the difference between 
the fair and reasonable cost of the actual performance and 
the cost of performing the work in the absence of misrepre-
sentation. To the reasonable value of the services and mate-
rials, the trial court added 10 percent as compensation for 
indirect overhead, plus 15 percent of total as compensation 
for the profit to which the contractor was deemed to be en-
titled. The supreme court found no fault with this formula 
for measuring compensatory damages. 3 
However, Souza had had collateral dealings with Armco, 
the supplier of pipe for the job, whereby the latter had guar-
anteed performance of the piping and had promised to indem-
nify Souza for any loss. The city offered evidence as to an 
alleged compromise agreement between Armco and Souza. 
That agreement, claimed the city, compensated Souza in 
whole, or in part, for the city's "breach." This evidence was 
excluded by the trial court, and, because of this, the case was 
reversed. 
The issue raised was concerned with the "collateral source" 
doctrine. The Supreme Court reviewed the doctrine generally 
and held that, to the extent it was designed to exclude the 
benefits of collateral sources of compensation in calculating 
a tortfeasor's liability in damages, it is punitive in nature. 
On this assumption the doctrine would have no applicability 
when a government entity, free from punitive liability, was 
the tortfeasor; hence other sources of compensation (even 
contractual claims for indemnity) could be shown to exist. 
The implication of this potentially important decision is that 
the government, though liable in tort, is in effect entitled to 
the benefit of the injured party's insurance. 
3. City of Salinas v. Souza & McCue 
Construction Co. Inc., 66 Ca1.2d 217, 
57 Cal. Rptr. 337, 424 P.2d 921 (1967). 
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Damages plus Injunction 
A rather unusual combination of remedies for deceit was 
sanctioned by the Supreme Court in Green Trees Enterprises, 
Inc. v. Palm Springs Alpine Estates, Inc.,4 wherein a tort 
action for deceit by a grantee of realty resulted in a judgment 
for punitive damages and a reduction of the purchase price. 
As a further remedy, the court granted a temporary injunction 
against foreclosing an outstanding trust deed (which was still 
less than the judicially reduced price) because the gestures 
toward foreclosure interfered with plaintiff's attempts to dis-
pose of the property. A decree extending the temporary order 
was the subject of the appeal to the California Supreme Court. 
Rescission: Mechanics of -Punitive Damages-More 
Election Problems 
The defrauded party may, of course, elect to disaffirm the 
bargain and seek restitution-legal or equitable. Sections 
1691-1693 of the Civil Code were passed in 1961 purporting 
to create but a single action "based on rescission" and to 
eliminate prior distinctions between legal and equitable rescis-
sion. The failure to mention the statutes in some cases may 
suggest that the distinctions supposedly eliminated lie deeper 
than the statutes' cut. For example, Efron v. Kalmanovitz5 
involved a derivative suit by a corporate shareholder relating 
to a sale of assets by the corporation to another corporation 
wholly owned by the seller's dominant shareholder. Restitu-
tion and appropriate equitable relief by way of a constructive 
trust, equitable lien, or money payment (depending on how 
far tracing could be had) was decreed. The defendant's 
objection to the form of the decree, that rescission of the con-
tract was not expressly adjudged, was properly overruled by 
the court. This was an equity decree effecting restitution by 
its own operation. Nothing was said about the statutory 
"action based upon a rescission" which would have been ill-
adapted to the situation at hand. 
4. 66 Cal.2d 782, 59 Cal. Rptr. 141, 5. 249 Cal. App.2d 187, 57 Cal. 
427 P.2d 805 (1967). Rptr. 248 (1967). 
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Joinder of counts for deceit and for restitution are permis-
sible, subject to the ultimately required election. Thus, in 
Klein v. Benaron,6 the defendant, president of the Gamble 
Ranch Investment Company, a Nevada corporation, obtained 
$50,500 from plaintiff, giving in exchange a promissory note, 
stock in the company, and a false promise to use the money 
to buy additional land. Plaintiff sued for deceit plus puni-
tive damages and appended a common count to the complaint. 
In connection with the latter count, attachment was had which 
was dissolved by order of the Superior Court. This order 
was reversed on appeal in a holding which seems quite correct. 
The plaintiff had restored everything of value, so the case 
resolves into a classic example of rescission in pais (rescission 
at law, out-of-court rescission, disaffirmance, or other variant 
expressions) followed by a quasi-contractual action for restitu-
tion in conjunction with which an attachment is proper. The 
California rescission statutes were not mentioned, but 
there is nothing in the decision incompatible therewith. On 
the election point, the appellate court noted in its reversal 
that there may well be an election which would result not from 
the mere joinder of counts of deceit and quasi-contract, but 
from the restoration of benefits by the plaintiff, indicating an 
intent and attempt to rescind, coupled with the detriment 
caused by the attachment. The court also indicated that such 
an election might terminate the claim for exemplary damages. 
On this last point-whether rescission plus punitive dam-
ages is permissible-the recent California cases are in con-
flict. In addition to the statement in Klein, there is similar 
dictum in Brockway v. Heilman that rescission precludes 
punitive damages. 7 The court gives as authority for this posi-
tion Crogan v. Metz,8 although the Crogan case is one for 
the recovery of secret profits from an agent, not for rescission. 
On the other hand, in Millar v. James,9 in which a con-
veyance of realty was obtained by fraud of the grantee, the 
6. 247 Cal. App.2d 607, 56 Cal. Rptr. 8. 47 Cal.2d 398, 303 P.2d 1029 
5 (1967). (1956). 
7. 250 Cal. App.2d 807, 58 Cal. Rptr. 9. 254 Cal. App.2d 570, 62 Cal. Rptr. 
772 (1967). 335 (1967). 
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grantor obtained a decree cancelling the deed and quieting 
his title, and a monetary award for loss of use. It was held 
that plaintiff could also obtain punitive damages as well as 
rescission, citing Topanga Corp. v. Gentile. 10 In the latter 
case, restitution plus punitive damages was ordered in favor 
of a corporation against a promoter in a fraud case. Ward 
v. Taggertll was cited. 
Although the holding in Millar v. James is unequivocal, 
its lineage is suspect. Ward v. Taggert may lend itself to 
the construction that both restitution and punitive damages 
may be had, but Ward v. Taggert was not a rescission case 
and no election between substantive rights was involved. In 
any event, some clarification is urgently needed. 
One other 1967 case involving an election problem did 
refer to section 1693 of the Civil Code. That section sanc-
tions the joinder of a claim for tort damages based on af-
firmance with a claim based on rescission. The inexorable 
election between the two must still be made, and if mishandled 
can lead to a loss of all remedies. In Doctor v. Lakeridge 
Construction CO.,t2 the plaintiff, a land developer, bought a 
vacant lot and claimed a misrepresentation as to land con-
ditions affecting building possibilities. An action for dam-
ages was filed in July, 1963, but no mention of rescission was 
made until the pretrial statement in February, 1966. The 
fraud claim was lost for want of proof of the substantive ele-
ments of the tort of deceit, which might not have been required 
for rescission had the right of election been held open. But not 
acting promptly to rescind, the plaintiff had elected to affirm 
and was remedially bound by the choice. 
Remedies for Duress, Undue Influence, Etc. 
In the absence of a defined tort of duress or undue in-
fluence, remedial possibilities are confined to rescission or 
cancellation of transactions induced thereby. In Odorizzi v. 
10. 249 Cal. App.2d 681, 58 Cal. 12. 252 Cal. App.2d 778, 60 Cal. 
Rptr. 713 (1967). Rptr. 824 (1967). 
11. 51 Cal.2d 736, 336 P2d 534 
(1959). 
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Bloomfield School District,I3 the plaintiff, a schoolteacher, 
had been booked by the police on charges of homosexuality 
and released on bail. Emotionally and mentally upset and 
sleepless for forty hours, he retired to his apartment, where 
he was met by school authorities who advised him to resign 
to avoid publicity, or otherwise face suspension and dismissal 
with the attendant notoriety. He resigned and then brought 
suit for declaratory relief which, in effect, requested the court 
to rescind his resignation pursuant to section 1689 of the 
Civil Code. The thrust of plaintiff's allegations was that he 
had trust and confidence in the representations of the school 
authorities so that they were able to substitute their will and 
judgment for his own and cause him to submit a resignation. 
A demurrer to the complaint without leave to amend was 
sustained. On appeal, the court held that neither fraud nor 
mistake was pleaded in the complaint. Further, neither com-
mon-law duress nor menace was pleaded because the only 
threat was to take such legal proceedings as was the duty of 
the officials to bring, and this was in no sense unlawful if 
done in good faith. Parenthetically, it could have been added 
that the concept of common-law duress requires that the 
defendant originate the coercion operative upon the plain-
tiff's will and, apart from the good-faith threats to institute 
proceedings, the defendant and its agents were not responsible 
for the pressures bearing upon the plaintiff. This eliminated 
all grounds for rescission as mentioned in section 1689 except 
"undue influence," and on this ground the lower court was 
reversed. In contrast to "legal" duress, undue influence is a 
concept of equitable origin, characteristically applied to 
abuses of the inherent influence possessed by one in a fidu-
ciary or confidential relation to another. Undue influence 
has been given an expanded definition in section 1575 of 
the Civil Code, subsection (2), as "taking an unfair advantage 
of another's weakness of mind", and in subsection (3) as 
"taking a grossly oppressive and unfair advantage of another's 
necessities or distress." In none of these variations is there 
13. 246 Cal. App.2d 123, 54 Cal. 
Rptr. 533 (1966). 
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the requirement-so important for common-law duress-that 
the defendant be responsible for the plaintiff's difficult posi-
tion. The appellate court in Odorizzi concluded that a cause 
of action for rescission was stated under both subsections 
1575 (2) and (3). An extended discussion of the case need 
not be undertaken here, because of the probable ad hoc appli-
cation of the considerations elaborated upon. Let it be said 
that section 1575 (3) appears to be more a generalized codi-
fication of the broad equitable notion of "unconscionability" 
than a specific variety of "undue influence." If this inference 
is correct, there is little likelihood that the provisions of 
section 1575 (3) will be given application much beyond situ-
ations such as the Odorizzi case, particularly where regular 
commercial transactions might be concerned. There is little 
in the history of section 1575 (3) to show such extension 
despite the elasticity of the language, and Odorizzi relies al-
most exclusively on precedents from testamentary dispositions 
and confidential relationships between persons with notable 
disparities in ability. California did not adopt the uncon-
scionability provisions of article 2, section 302, of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, and although a distinct doctrine of "busi-
ness compulsion" seems to be evolving, the concept of "undue 
influence," even as expanded by statute, has not had as much 
influence as might be expected in this state. 
Odorizzi leaves unanswered the question of whether a jury 
trial would be a matter of right on the issues raised in pur-
suing this essentially equitable relief. 
Remedies for Mistake 
Mistake in Non-Bargaining Transactions 
The collapse of a subdivision project resulted in an in-
teresting and perhaps important decision in which the equit-
able restitutionary remedy of a lien was used to save a lending 
institution from a peculiarly egregious error. In this case, 
Jones v. Sacramento Savings & Loan Association,14 a group 
of purchase money trust deeds securing loans of $806.45 per 
14. 248 Cal. App.2d 522, 56 Cal. sion, see McIntosh, Real Property, in 
Rptr. 741 (1967). For further discus- this volume. 
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lot, all drafted to permit subordination in favor of the an-
ticipated construction loans, were outstanding. Some time 
later, Sacramento Savings & Loan Association advanced con-
struction monies secured by trust deeds amounting to $11,000 
to $12,000 per lot and the monies were indeed used for inprove-
ments. Sacramento Savings intended that the purchase money 
trust deeds would be subordinated, but through inadvertence 
this was not accomplished. Jones acquired (at a discount) the 
purchase money trust deeds which fortuitously had priority. 
Upon default, both Jones and Sacramento Savings took sepa-
rate foreclosure measures, and the trustees' sales of various 
houses and lots took place more or less contemporaneously, 
and in some cases overlapped. No sale produced a bid in 
excess of the secured debt of the particular beneficiary. As 
the appellate court described it: 
The sales to Jones in enforcement of the senior liens 
wiped out the junior liens of Sacramento Savings. . . . 
In those cases where Jones' trustee was the first to give 
notices and hold sales, the subsequent sales on behalf 
of Sacramento Savings conveyed no title to Sacramento 
Savings and succeeded only in clouding Jones' title. 
Where Sacramento Savings' trustee was the 
first to give notices and hold sales, Sacramento Savings 
purchased title subordinate to the senior liens of [Jones].15 
J ones, perhaps feeling overly secure, filed this suit to quiet 
title, presumably to facilitate the marketability of the houses 
(or at least some of them) at retail, and the trial court ruled 
in his favor. 
The position of Sacramento Savings was, of course, analo-
gous to that of one who mistakenly improves the property 
of another, except that it had provided the money for the 
improvements instead of the improvements themselves. The 
legal position of the mistaken improver of the land of another 
is not a comfortable one. "Betterment Statutes" may allow 
removal of the improvements (hardly a solution here) and 
15. 248 Cal. App.2d at 528, 56 Cal. 
Rptr. at 745. 
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otherwise provide remedies by offset against claims by the 
owner rather than affirmative remedies. For example, section 
741 of the Code of Civil Procedure, relied upon by Jones, 
allows a mistaken trespasser to offset the value of improve-
ments only against damages when such are claimed in an 
ejectment action. 
The appellate court, however, reversed the ruling in favor 
of Jones and directed equitable liens on the various parcels 
in favor of Sacramento Savings to prevent unjust enrichment. 
The exact terms of the liens were left flexible within the dis-
cretion of the trial court, depending upon further develop-
ments as to marketing of the homes. Immediate foreclosure 
of the liens was definitely not suggested. Neither prior nor 
post-judgment interest was awarded as part of the liens. 
The decision here is a commendable utilization of equitable 
principles and remedies. The court properly rejected section 
741 of the Code of Civil Procedure as inapplicable. The 
suit to quiet title is equitable and the decision is no more 
than an application of the maxim: "He who seeks equity, 
must do equity." The equitable lien imposed no personal 
obligation on Jones, as would a money judgment for resti-
tution, so the argument against "improving the owner out 
of his property" is a voided. Had Jones not sued to quiet 
title, however, it is doubtful that there would have been any 
affirmative restitutionary remedy available to Sacramento 
Savings. 
When a person mistakenly pays property taxes on the wrong 
parcel, he has no common-law right of restitution from the 
taxing authority in California. A statutory remedy is afforded 
for, among other things, taxes "erroneously collected," but 
this does not cover the payor's mistake. 16 If statutory resti-
tution is sought, however, the action is said to be governed 
by equitable principles.17 The correlative question of resti-
tution from the property owner whose premises were relieved 
from the tax claim did not arise during the year. 
16. Sierra Inv. Corp. v. County of 
Sacramento, 252 Cal. App.2d 339, 60 
Cal. Rptr. 519 (1967). 
20 
17. See, e.g., El Tejon Cattle Co. v. 
County of San Diego, 252 Cal. App.2d 
449, 60 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1967). 
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Mistake as to Existence of a Contract: Restitution for 
Services Rendered in Reliance 
The person mistakenly performing services benefiting an-
other is in much the same position as the mistaken improver 
of another's property. Specific restitution is impossible and 
a translation of his claim into one for money would place a 
harsh burden upon the recipient of the services, who would 
have to come up with money to pay for something, the value 
of which may be dubious as well as intangible, for which he 
would have struck no bargain. Restitution is not auto-
matically accorded in all instances,18 and even when it is, 
the quasi-contractual benefit is measured from the standpoint 
of the recipient. 
A special case obtains, however, when services are rendered 
at the request of the defendant in connection with a "contract" 
which never materializes-or, put another way, in misreliance 
upon a nonexistent contract, but with the knowledge and at 
the request of the recipient. A line of authority establishes 
the measure of quasi-contractual recovery here in terms of 
the reasonable value of the work, even though of no benefit 
to the recipient. This is the gist of a dissenting opinion by 
Chief Justice Traynor in Coleman Engineering Company v. 
North American A viation. 19 Since the case was decided in 
terms of breach of an express contract, the opinion is tech-
nically no more than an augury for a future rule of restitution 
when suitable litigation arises. There is nothing wrong with 
this rule of measurement of quantum meruit recovery for mis-
take in special circumstances, but the disguise of reliance 
damages in the language of restitution of benefits should fool 
no one. Perhaps it is more important to preserve the legal 
symmetry of contract law, than to worry about precision in 
the much more unstructured rules of "unjust enrichment." 
Mistakes in Integration 
Whether or not a subdivider who has sold all the houses 
is an "aggrieved party" within the meaning of section 3399 
18. See Restatement of the Law of 19. 65 Cal.2d 396, 55 Cal. Rptr. 1, 
Restitutions §§ 40-41. 420 P.2d 713 (1966). 
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;)f the Civil Code was one of the questions raised in a suit 
to reform provisions with respect to access to a street within 
the subdivision. The actual aggrieved party was the last 
purchaser on a cul-de-sac street whose right of access was 
challenged by earlier residents. To straighten out the situ-
ation required modifications of prior deeds to which the late-
comer was not a party. The subdivider was allowed to 
maintain the suit.20 
Remedies for Breach of Contract 
Contracts for the Sale of Land; Breach by Buyer-
Damages 
The textbook equitable remedies available to the vendor 
because of the purchaser's breach are in current disfavor in 
California, what with such things as anti-deficiency legislation 
as to instalment contracts and the general obstacle to specific 
performance inherent in the Civil Code requirement that the 
plaintiff establish that the consideration be adequate and the 
bargain just and reasonable.! 
On the other hand, there is doubt that the vendor will, 
as a practical matter, very often be able to establish general 
damages for the purchaser's failure to perform. According 
to section 3307 of the Civil Code, the measure of damages 
for breach of contract to purchase real property is the amount 
by which the contract price exceeds the value of the property 
to the seller on the date of breach. If the contract is an in-
stalment one, and the breach delayed, the vendor might as 
well forget it. If the contract is the usual down payment plus 
a trust deed for the balance at close of escrow, the vendor's 
claim for general damages is complicated by certain evi-
dentiary difficulties. In Newhart v. Pierce,2 the plaintiffs 
owned an operating cattle ranch in Nevada, which they con-
tracted to sell in April, 1957, for $171,500 (this figure ex-
cludes the price of the livestock and certain other extraneous 
and diverse consideration). The purchase price was to be 
20. Shupe v. Nelson, 254 Cal. App.2d 2. 254 Cal. App.2d 856, 62 Cal. Rptr. 
744, 62 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1967). 553 (1967). 
1. Cal. Civ. Code § 3391(1) and (2). 
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secured by a trust deed. The close of escrow was extended 
to July 1, 1957. The purchaser defaulted, and after eighteen 
months the ranch was exchanged for other properties, which 
the plaintiff in the present action for damages vaguely esti-
mated as being worth $95,000. The plaintiff also gave his 
opinion (or "guess") as to the value to him at the time of 
breach as $150,000. The appellate court concluded that the 
owner could competently testify as to value (since the statu-
tory measure is based on a sUbjective standard, the rule 
could hardly be otherwise), and that resale price is likewise 
competent, if not conclusive, evidence. Nonetheless, the evi-
dence was held insufficient to sustain the trial court's finding 
that the value at the time of breach was $150,000. 
Instead, the appellate court stated the rule that: 
[W]here (a) the contract price is not excessive and (b) 
there is no decline in the market before the resale date, 
it follows that the contract price and the value on the 
date of breach are the same.3 
Since plaintiff admitted the contract price was not excessive 
and there was no indication of a general drop-off in land 
values, there were no general damages sustained in the case. 
It is to be noted that this formula places the vendor at some 
disadvantage in the ordinary sale through escrow. The ven-
dor, if directly confronted at trial, is not likely to admit that 
the contract price was excessive, nor are land values likely to 
drop appreciably during the normal period of escrow. 
The vendor, in an executory land sale contract, is generally 
precluded from suing to recover the purchase price in Cali-
fornia, since he holds the security of a vendor's lien subject 
to the restrictions of the anti-deficiency statute which cannot 
be evaded by a purported waiver of the lien. If there is in 
fact no security of any sort, however, the vendor may bring 
an action on the purchase money note. Thus in Van Vleck 
Realty v. Gaunt,4 an action was brought on a $15,000 note 
given as part of the original purchase price and the plaintiff 
3. 254 Cal. App.2d at 865, 62 Cal. 4. 250 Cal. App.2d 81, 58 Cal. Rptr. 
Rptr. at 560. 246 (1967). 
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was permitted recovery. The case is not ordinary. The prop-
erty was conveyed on the security of a trust deed together with 
the "unsecured" note. Upon default the premises were re-
conveyed in settlement, but the $15,000 note was excluded 
from the settlement. Therefore, despite superficial appear-
ances, the action here was on an absolutely unsecured note, 
free from even the possible existence of the ephemeral 
grantor's lien. 
Breach by Vendor-Specific Performance 
Cases in this category, decided within the past year, present 
only the usual equitable problems. Specific performance was 
denied in Loeb v. Wilson5 because of inadequacy of con-
sideration and unilateral mistake as to the nature of the 
vendor's title. The decree also made the vendor immune to 
incidental damages. In Am-Cal Investment Co. v. Sharlyn 
Estates, Inc.,6 the vendor breached by anticipatory repUdiation 
in the form of a conveyance to another during escrow. A 
decree for the purchaser was reversed for lack of a showing 
that the plaintiff was able and willing to perform at the time 
performance was due, rather than at the time of trial. A 
breach by anticipatory repudiation is only an excuse for non-
tender of performance. The remand embodied a suggestion 
to the trial court to consider, in the event plaintiff is not en-
titled to specific performance, the imposition of damages as 
an alternative to the mere restitution of the money deposited 
in escrow. 
Specific performance was granted in Alfinito v. Sater,7 de-
spite a barrage of defenses ranging from non-performance 
of conditions to unclean hands. 
Contracts for the Sale of Chattels: Breach of Warranty-
Damages 
For breach of warranty in connection with the sale of 
tomato seeds, the court, in Klein v. Asgrow Seed Company,S 
5. 253 Cal. App.2d 438, 61 Cal. Rptr. 7. 246 Cal. App.2d 362, 54 Cal. Rptr. 
377 (1967). 636 (1966). 
6. 255 Cal. App.2d 622, 63 Cal. Rptr. 8. 246 Cal. App.2d 87, 54 Cal. Rptr. 
518 (1967). 609 (1966). 
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held the measure of damages was the difference between the 
reasonable market value of the crop actually produced and 
the value of the theoretical crop had the warranty been com-
plied with, less the necessary expenses of raising and selling. 
This conclusion was based on former Civil Code section 
1789 (6), but the court commented that it was also the 
measure under the present Commercial Code section 
2714(2). 
Contracts for the Sale of Stocks: Breach by Buyer-
Damages 
Sackett v. Spindler9 arose out of a contract to sell all out-
standing shares of the corporation which owned the Santa 
Clara Journal. The buyer repudiated. The appellate court 
affirmed the measure of damages as the difference between 
the contract price and the price obtained on a resale of the 
shares a year later. It held that the Uniform Sales Act then 
in effect did not apply to shares of stock, and that the general 
damage statute in California did not (in cases other than the 
sale of realty) compel rigid adherence to the rule of "sale 
price less market value" at the time of breach. The absence 
of a ready market for the shares justified the variant measure 
here. The allowance of prejudgment interest by the lower 
court was reversed. 
Construction Contracts-Breach by Owner 
In Alec Ferguson Electrical Contractors v. Integrated, 
Inc./o the defendant breached by stopping progress payments. 
In reversing and remanding for retrial, the appellate court 
noted the anomaly in this state that the failure to make prog-
ress payments is not a total breach as would entitle the con-
tractor to sue for damages, but is enough so that he may 
rescind and recover in quasi-contract for part performance. 
Yet, even for the latter remedy to be available, the failure 
to make progress payments must be substantial. This means 
9. 248 Cal. App.2d 220, 56 Cal. Rptr. 10. 250 Cal. App.2d 287, 58 Cal. 
435 (1967). Rptr. 503 (1967). 
310 CAL LAW 1967 
28
Cal Law Trends and Developments, Vol. 1967, Iss. 1 [1967], Art. 13
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1967/iss1/13
Remedies 
that the evaluation of available remedies is complicated by 
three levels of contract breach. 
Contract of Employment: Breach by Employer-
Damages-M itigation 
The discharged employee in Erler v. Five Points Motorsll 
sued for the balance of the contracted compensation for the 
unexpired term. The defendant entered a general denial. 
The trial court excluded evidence both as to what plaintiff 
had earned after the breach and as to what he might reason-
ably have earned with the exercise of reasonable diligence, on 
the ground that matters in mitigation of damage should have 
been affirmatively pleaded. The appellate court held that 
the plaintiff, of course, has a duty to minimize damages. He 
also has the duty of proving actual damages, and the amount 
he actually earned after defendant's breach bears upon his 
actual damage. Therefore evidence as to actual damages 
can be introduced under a general denial. On the other hand, 
what plaintiff might reasonably have earned (which the court 
characterized as "true mitigation") is an affirmative matter 
and is the proper subject of defensive pleading. All this 
may help in distinguishing between three separate matters-
avoidable consequences, minimization of damages, and miti-
gation of damages. 
Breach of a Dealership Contract: Specific Performance 
In Thayer Plymouth Center Inc. v. Chrysler Motors 
Corp.,12 the appellate court reversed a preliminary injunc-
tion against terminating plaintiffs' dealership. The reasons 
given were the usual equitable ones: adequacy of damages, 
a principal-agent relationship, and the difficulty of continuous 
supervision of a contract calling for co-operation. 
11. 249 Cal. App.2d 560, 57 Cal. 12. 255 Cal. App.2d 337, 63 Cal. 
Rptr. 516 (1967). Rptr. 148 (1967). 
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Remedies for Breach of Nominally Unenforceable Trans-
actions 
Transactions Unenforceable Because of the Lack of a 
Writing; Oral Contracts to Devise Realty-Quasi-
Specific Performance 
The common problem of the oral promise to devise realty 
in exchange for services during the "testator's" lifetime was 
again presented in Riganti v. McElhinney.13 In this case, 
specific performance was decreed although services were per-
formed for only six years ("not the length but the breadth," 
says the court). The case is useful only as containing further 
illustrations as to the type of services that will incline a deci-
sion in favor of specific performance for the property rather 
than quasi-contract recovery for the services. The defendant 
unsuccessfully advanced the unusual argument that plaintiff 
could not obtain a decree here because the holder of an 
equitable title cannot quiet title against the legal owner. 
Conveyances on Oral Trust 
In Adams v. Young,14 the usual remedy of a constructive 
trust was decreed for breach of an oral promise to hold prop-
erty in trust. The confidential relationship between the parties 
sufficed for equitable jurisdiction. As per statute15 in Cali-
fornia, the trust is constructed for the benefit of the person 
who would otherwise have had the res rather than in favor 
of the grantor's estate-a result which, as is often pointed 
out, is precisely the same as if there were a trust indenture. 
The evidentiary aspect of this case is of mild interest, as the 
conveyance was made over fifty years ago and direct testi-
mony, save for that of an 84-year-old woman of uncertain 
memory, was unavailable. The statute of limitations, of 
course, begins to run only upon repudiation of the "trust." 
13. 248 Cal. App.2d 116, 56 Cal. 14. 255 Cal. App2d 177, 62 Cal. 
Rptr. 195 (1967). Rptr. 877 (1967). 
15. Cal. Civ. Code § 2224. 
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Other Breaches by Fiduciaries 
In a typical case of a diversion of a benefit by a real estate 
agent who had title to property (as to which he was employed 
to negotiate) taken in the name of his wife, the agent at-
tempted to avoid liability for a constructive trust because 
there was no memorandum in writing signed by the defendant 
sufficient to satisfy the statute. The justice's initial paragraph 
disposes of this defense to an equitable remedy: 
[T]his is yet another case of the faithless agent attempt-
ing to hide his double-dealing behind the skirts of the 
statute of frauds. But skirts are not as voluminous as 
they once were nor the coverage of the statute as com-
prehensive as it was sometimes thought to be. Un-
shapely limbs and unsightly conduct alike are today 
disclosed to public view, and both must risk the conse-
quences of full exposure.16 
The statute of frauds does not apply to a case which is essen-
tially in equity to impress a constructive trust. 
Transactions Unenforceable Because of Illegality-Restitu. 
tion 
The general rule which allows no remedies in favor of 
either party to an illegal transaction was quite properly ap-
plied in two cases during 1967-Pyle v. ShipmanI7 (violation 
of Corporate Securities Law) and Goldstein v. EnochI8 (an 
indirect attempt to obtain a share of profits from an illegal 
transaction) . 
The sale of stock without a permit is illegal, but usually 
a buyer is allowed restitution because of the "not in pari 
delicto" exception. The prohibitive statute is designed to 
protect one of the parties (the plaintiff-buyer) in the trans-
action. This exception was applied in Maner v. Mydland. 19 
The "not in pari delicto" exception was also invoked to 
16. Gerhardt v. Weiss, 247 Cal. App. 18. 248 Cal. App.2d 891, 57 Cal. 
2d 115, 55 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1966). Rptr. 19 (1967). 
17. 251 Cal. App.2d 913, 60 Cal, 19. 250 Cal. App.2d 526, 58 Cal. 
Rptr. 46 (1967). Rptr, 740 (1967). 
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allow a small dairyman to recover illegal rebates from the 
president of a large creamery.20 The rebates were made to 
secure and retain so-called "Grade A contracts" for the sale 
of his milk. Without such "Grade A contracts" it appeared 
the plaintiff would be unable to make a financial success of 
the business. The statute forbidding such rebates applied 
literally to both producers and distributors, so the parties 
were technically in pari delicto under the statute. However, 
the court held that the exercise of economic coercion made 
the plaintiff less at fault and allowed restitution. 
An equitable balance between the policy against enforcing 
illegal bargains and the policy against unjust enrichment was 
reached in Hainey v. Narigon.l The defendant was a veteran 
entitled to a G.!. loan for housing. The plaintiff, his brother-
in-law, was not a veteran. In order to avoid the laws restrict-
ing the benefits of veterans' loans, a house was bought in 
the defendant's name. The plaintiff, who was in possession, 
made essentially all payments on the G.!. loan, plus other 
outlays for twelve years. Plaintiff then sued for a declaration 
of a resulting trust, which would obviously judicially effect 
an illegal bargain. The defendant, on the other hand, would 
be equally obviously enriched by taking advantage of a vio-
lation of a statute designed merely to afford him certain ex-
clusive benefits. The trial court followed the general rule 
and allowed the defense of illegality. On appeal the decision 
was reversed and the plaintiff was given an equitable lien, 
covering all payments, including interest, taxes, insurance, 
and out-of-pocket expenses in making permanent improve-
ments. He was, however, deprived of the title to the prop-
erty and a sizeable increase in market value. Such a decree 
is another creditable application of equitable principles and 
remedies to mitigate a harsh rule of law. The law cannot very 
well provide legal remedies for a bargain which the law says 
is illegal, but equity should permit of adjustments to prevent 
an enrichment unwarranted by the degree of illegality in-
volved. 
20. Karpinski v. Collins, 252 Cal. 1. 247 Cal. App.2d 528, SS Cal. Rptr. 
App.2d 768, 60 Cal. Rptr. 846 (1967). 638 (1966). 
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